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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8129
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
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RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHZA/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2065
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4758
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 4429
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1575
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 2364
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1611
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000403

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SUBJECT: YUDHOYONO TEHERAN VISIT -- AMBASSADOR URGES YES
VOTE ON IRAN RESOLUTION

REF: SECSTATE 19694

Classified By: Ambassador Cameron R. Hume for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

11. (C) SUMMARY: Presidential Adviser Dino Djalal told the Ambassador on February 28 that President Yudhoyono would visit Iran on March 10-11 and intended to deliver a "firm" message on the need for Iran to comply with the IAEA process regarding Iran's nuclear program. Ambassador underscored that Indonesia would create the context for the visit by the way Indonesia voted on the upcoming Iran resolution in the UN Security Council. Indonesian support for the resolution would allow Yudhoyono to deliver a firm message for compliance. END SUMMARY.

YUDHOYONO TO VISIT IRAN MARCH 10-11

12. (C) Djalal said President Yudhoyono had asked him to inform Ambassador Hume of the president's plans to make a bilateral visit to Iran on March 10-11. The visit would occur en route to Dakar for a meeting of Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and might also include stops in Nigeria, Mozambique and South Africa. Iranian President Ahmedinedjad had visited Indonesia two or three times and had invited Yudhoyono to Iran. Vice President Kalla had intended to travel to Iran several months earlier, but that trip had been cancelled because the optics of Kalla's going before the president would have created problems with the legislature (DPR). Yudhoyono's trip would show the Indonesian public that "we have a different opinion regarding Iran," Djalal emphasized, "that we can vote for Resolution 1747 but still have a bilateral relationship with Iran."

13. (C) Djalal said the administration was aware of ongoing discussions at the United Nations but had not decided how it would vote. It was studying the new IAEA report. Djalal also said Yudhoyono would "be firm" with Ahmedinedjad: that Iran had to cooperate with the IAEA and that this was the only way to gain the support of the international community. Indonesia was also "toying with the idea" of addressing the problem of an Iranian nuclear fuel supply in a multilateral rather than a bilateral context. He said the administration would appreciate receiving "any message or analysis" that Washington had to share before the trip.

INDONESIA'S VOTE WILL CREATE CONTEXT FOR VISIT

¶4. (C) Ambassador said he had no personal view regarding a Yudhoyono visit to Iran and noted that he was not party to the tenor of the negotiations in New York. However, the way Indonesia voted on the new resolution would create the context for Yudhoyono's visit. If Indonesia supported the resolution, the visit would put the president in a strong position to deliver a friendly but firm message. That message would be that Iran had to meet its obligations with the international community and could then proceed with a peaceful nuclear program. If Indonesia abstained, the context would be very different. In the latter case, Ahmedinedjad would spin the visit to his own advantage. Ambassador said U.S. official views on this matter were strong and constant. This was a nonproliferation matter of the gravest importance, and that position would not change.

¶5. (C) Ambassador gave Djalal a copy of reftel points on the briefing provided in New York by IAEA Deputy Director General for Safeguards Olli Heinonen. There were two areas of activity: uranium enrichment and intellectual efforts toward weaponization. Together, these created legitimate concerns. It would be better for all sides, including Iran, to resolve these concerns.

NO ILLUSIONS REGARDING AHMEDINEDJAD

¶6. (C) Djalal said President Yudhoyono was mindful that Ahmedinedjad might use the visit for propaganda purposes. Djalal noted that, during a previous visit to Jakarta, Ahmedinedjad had turned a question-and-answer session after the meeting with Yudhoyono into a half-hour speech against

JAKARTA 00000403 002 OF 002

the West, deeply angering Yudhoyono. Yudhoyono would not allow that to happen again, and the administration was tailoring the upcoming visit to Teheran to avoid any repetition. Yudhoyono intended to use the visit to convey international concerns about Iran's program. Yudhoyono had spoken candidly during his last meeting with Ahmedinedjad and would do so again on this visit.

¶7. (C) In conclusion, Ambassador underscored his view that Indonesia would create the context for the Yudhoyono visit by the way Indonesia voted on the Iran resolution.

HUME